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Asylum appeals: is there a 
better way?
by Judge David Pearl
In this article based on a public lecture delivered at the Institute 
of Advanced Legal Studies on 6 November 1999, Judge Pearl 
argues the case for a review of current procedures for dealing with 
asylum appeals and for consideration of a complete overhaul of 
administrative justice systems.
A sylum status determination has had a very difficult press in recent years, in part because of the considerable media interest in the subject. Asylum stories have been 
pouring out of the developed world's newspapers. By way of an 
example, the Belgian press has not been far behind some of the 
British media in highlighting the problems arising out of those 
seeking asylum. Thus on 11 October 1999 it was reported that:
' ... just three months old, Claudia Joskova badly needs a hernia 
operation. It is only one of her smaller problems in life. For half her 
existence Claudia has been on the run, ending up in a dark, decrepit 
classroom that her parents temporarily call home, some 1, 500 miles 
from her birthplace in the Kosic area of Slovakia. Like hundreds of 
Kosice Gypsies, the Joskovas are seeking asylum in Belgium at a time 
when countries across the European Union are trying to halt a rising 
tide of would-be immigrants.'
Political parties across Europe, in Switzerland and Austria in 
particular, have benefited from the concerns of those who wish 
to 'halt a rising tide of would-be immigrants'. In Ghent, as in 
Dover, city leaders are reported to have said that there has to be 
a stop to this, because the tolerance threshold has vanished. 
Media coverage in the UK of the Stansted Airport hijack 
incident illustrates in an all too stark form the virtual 
disintegration of a tolerant level.
In the European context, a high-level working group on 
Asylum and Migration has been engaged in conducting action 
plans both for selected countries of origin and for transit across 
states of asylum seekers. The European Council, at its meeting 
in Tampere, Finland, on IS and 16 October 1999, adopted the 
proposals of the Working Group and progressed towards a 
common EU policy. The Presidency Conclusions state:
'The European Council reaffirms the importance the Union and 
Member States attach to absolute respect of the right to seek asylum. It 
has agreed to work towards establishing a common European asylum 
system, based on the full and inclusive application ()fthe Geneva 
Convention, thus ensuring that nobody is sent back to persecution, i.e. 
maintaining the principle of non-refoulement.'
Amongst the general propositions within this statement of 
policy is an acceptance of common standards for a fair and 
efficient asylum procedure and the approximation of rules on 
the recognition and content of refugee status. Community rules 
should lead to a common asylum procedure and a uniform 
status for those who are granted asylum valid throughout the 
Union. This is however a long way off at the present time.
International law norms are essentially underdeveloped and 
provide little in the way of guidance in developing a model for 
refugee-status determination. Guy Goodwin-Gill, in The Refugee 
in International Law, refers to the following as minimum 
standards:
  knowledge of the case against one;
  an opportunity to submit evidence to rebut that case;
  reasoned negative decisions;o '
  the right to appeal against any adverse decision before an 
impartial tribunal independent of the initial decision-making 
bodv.
The Geneva Convention itself is silent when considering these 
procedural safeguards, and the UNHCR Executive Committee 
has said very little to develop any further guidance. Their 
Handbook, at para. 46, is equally undemanding, referring 
simply to:
' ... a formal reconsideration of the decision, either to the same or to 
a different authority, whether administrative or judicial, according to 
the prevailing system.'
The EU Intergovernmental Resolution on Minimumo
Guarantees on Asylum Procedures (5585/95) states:
'In the case of a negative decision, provision shall be made for an 
appeal to a court or a review authority which gives an independent 
ruling on individual cases under conditions laid down.'
There is therefore both in international law and practice and 
in European law an acceptance that there must be some provision 
for a merits appeal separate from the executive arm of 11
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government. It is my view that the merits appeal should be a last 
resort, to provide a safeguard against a wrong conclusion drawn 
by the initial decision maker. Unfortunately, this has not been 
the experience here in the UK. I believe strongly that resources 
should be front loaded, so that there is high quality initial 
decision making which would ensure appeal processes would 
only occasionally be required. A similar point has been made by 
every report and research project that has looked at this 
question over recent years. Under-resourcing at the early level 
simply leads to a paper pushing exercise, whereby cases are 
shifted from the Home Office to the Immigration Appellate 
Authorities and where all too often the Adjudicator (the first 
level of appeal at the Immigration Appellate Authorities) is in 
effect the first person to provide a serious analysis of the factual 
and legal situation presented by the applicant.
By way of an illustration, I can refer to the decision of NonufA 
y Sccrefun c^ \Sfdfc 1999 Imm AR 21, upheld by the Court of 
Appeal on 2 December 1999, where the tribunal commented 
critically on the standard of the initial interview and the refusal 
letter sent to the applicant by the Secretary of State. It even 
went as far as to suggest that the refusal letter seemed to bear nodo
relation to the story of what had happened to this applicant and 
his family as told to the interviewing officer and as repeated to 
the adjudicator.
The quality of decision making at the first and executive level
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is often justified by government ministers and their 
spokespersons by pointing to the low level of successful appeals, 
which in their view underlines the quality of the initial decision 
making. This approach is in my view misconceived. The 
Commission for Racial Equality said in 1985:
Vr uou/j 6c u fo .mppo.se
u .syste if ni// mrrecf
It is both a false economy and a flawed legal system which 
places emphasis solely on appeal rights.
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LACK OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS
We need a judicial framework to ensure that people who 
allege that they will be persecuted if returned to their countrvo ^ I y
of origin for one of the specified Geneva Convention reasons 
have their cases fairly and impartially considered. Persecution 
itself is not an easy concept to handle. Neither are some of 
the Convention's reasons, especially the definition of 'social 
group'. And there is no satisfactory international law 
definition of any of these concepts. To criticise the 
adjudicators and the tribunal for lack of consistency of 
approach is easy; but it stems from a failure to have common 
international law norms, leaving us all free to interpret the 
Convention as we will.
PRESENT SYSTEM AND ITS DEFECTS
The structure for asylum appeals in the UK has in effect been 
planted in the same soil as the well-watered system of 
immigration appeals. The system for immigration appeals was 
established in the UK in 1970 to deal with appeals from adverse 
decisions of Home Office officials concerning immigration into 
the UK either on a short term basis or for indefinite leave, and
appeals from entry clearance officers refusing visas. The original 
suggestion was that there be a tribunal composed of a legally 
qualified chairman and two lay members hearing appeals from 
'subordinate judicial officers' (called adjudicators) at ports. 
These 'judicial officers' would deal with an appeal immediately 
after the refusal by an immigration officer and these hearings 
would be followed by an immediate oral determination.
In practice that never happened, and what has developed is a 
sophisticated body of procedural rules and case law. This 
judicialisation, especially in the asylum context, has been much 
criticised. In desperation, it has been suggested that one tier
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should be removed, that the lay element of the tribunal should 
be removed, that judicial review of the refusal by a tribunal 
chairman of leave to appeal to the tribunal should be abolished, 
that more cases should be subjected to an expedited procedure, 
that draconian case management and time consequences should 
be imposed. The legislation in 1993, 1996 and now 1999, has 
all been directed at accelerating the procedures.
I personally believe that the emphasis on the procedural 
aspects of the issue hides the fundamental issue. We need a 
judicial framework to ensure that people who allege that they 
will be persecuted if returned to their country of origin for one 
of the specified Geneva Convention reasons have their cases 
fairly and impartially considered. Persecution itself is not an easy 
concept to handle. Neither are some of the Convention reasons, 
especially the definition of 'social group'. And there is no 
satisfactory international law definition of any of these concepts. 
To criticise the adjudicators and the tribunal for lack of 
consistency of approach is easy; but it stems from a failure to 
have common international law norms, leaving us all free to 
interpret the Convention as we will.
Judicial review is a blunt instrument, emphasising procedural 
defects, for example, in cases where a chairman of a tribunal has 
refused leave to appeal to itself, or where an adjudicator has 
dismissed an accelerated 'certified' appeal.
The current structure of appeals has not made it easy to provide 
answers to the complex questions of substantive law; for example 
to set out a consistent framework for issues such as internal flight, 
persecution in the context of a civil war (that is, being caught in 
the crossfire), and when discrimination becomes persecution.
A PROPOSAL
The time has come, in my view^ to grasp the nettle of judicial 
review. Much of my time as President was spent either agreeing 
to Treasury Solicitor's proposals to quash a chairman's refusal of 
leave to appeal to the tribunal or trying, usually unsuccessfully, 
to persuade him to fight a judicial review challenge. I was never 
certain of the constitutional position of these deliberations, not 
least in that although technically the tribunal's decision is the 
one which is being challenged, the tribunal is not itself 
represented, and the Treasury Solicitor's client is the Secretary 
of State, who is a party to the proceedings before the 
Immigration Appellate Authorities. The volume of appeals is 
compounded by tight time limits, and failure by the 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal to consider the application for 
leave to appeal to itself within the specified time limits results in 
leave to appeal having been deemed to have been granted. Rigid 
time limits for filing grounds for appeal from the adjudicators to 
the tribunal, and draconian results for the tribunal if they fail to
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deal with the matter within further tight time scales, are 
counter-productive. Representatives have little choice but to file 
protective appeals (even the Secretary of State docs this); and 
chairmen have little time to deal with the appeal except by way 
of a formulaic procedure.
I would suggest that the opportunity should be taken to 
consider a complete overhaul of administrative justice, for some 
of the difficulties outlined here in relation to asylum status 
determination apply equally in other tribunal structures. I 
believe that the larger tribunal systems, especially Immigration 
and Asylum, Mental Health, Employment, and the Social 
Security and Tax Tribunals, should be loosely co-ordinated into 
an administrative court, with a second tier being granted a Court 
of Record status with High Court Judges serving as chairmen. 
There should then be an appeal from these courts on a point of 
law to the Court of Appeal. Judicial review would be available, 
of course, in the event of any procedural error within the 
system, but I suspect that the Crown Office would not be
engaged to any great extent. The Australian model of a multi- 
jurisdictional Administrative Appeal Tribunal bears close 
scrutiny. Judicial review has played its part in developing the 
system of administrative law in this country, but now, with the 
Human Rights Act 1998 nearing implementation, we should be 
concentrating on substantive rights rather than on procedural 
defects. This may be a dream, but I do think it worthy of serious 
debate. ©
Judge David Pearl
Director of Studies, Judicial Studies Board
Judge Pearl has been both President of the Immigration Appeal 
Tribunal and Chief Adjudicator, Immigration Appeals.
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